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I. INTRODUCTION
Voting is one of America’s most cherished rights.1  America’s con-
stitutional system maintains a connection between the right to vote
and political reality by requiring that every ten years, after the federal
census has been taken, seats in the House of Representatives be di-
vided among the states according to population.2  Each state is divided
into Congressional districts by that state’s legislature, subject to the
requirements of federal law,3 requirements the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Bartlett v. Strickland4 loosened.
Though Bartlett loosened congressional districting mandates on
state legislatures, state power was not the foremost concern in the
Justices’ minds.  Rather, the Court devoted more attention to an issue
that has plagued America for centuries: race.  In Bartlett, the role of
race in the electoral process came before the Court through a debate
on crossover districts and their role under the Voting Rights Act.  A
crossover district is “one in which minority voters make up less than a
majority of the voting-age population,” yet “at least potentially, [are
numerous] enough to elect the candidate of [their] choice with help
from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to
support the minority’s preferred candidate.”5
Given that the Supreme Court has claimed America desires to be-
come a color blind society,6 it should not be surprising that American
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candi-
date of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society . . . .”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  The process of “[r]ealign[ing] . . . a legislative dis-
trict’s boundaries to reflect changes in population and ensure proportional repre-
sentation by elected officials” is known as “reapportionment” or “redistricting.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (9th ed. 2009).
3. Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (No. 07-689) [hereinafter States’
Brief] (“Every ten years, based on the results of the decennial census, state and
local legislatures redraw district lines to comply with the Equal Protection
Clause and § 2’s prohibition against vote dilution.  Whether § 2 permits, or re-
quires, less-than-50% minority, coalition districts has a significant impact on how
legislatures draw district lines.”)
4. 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
5. Id. at 1242 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).  The Court sometimes calls
these “coalitional districts.” Id. (citing Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364,
371 (N.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009)).
The term “coalitional district,” however, can also refer to a district where two
minority groups vote together to elect a candidate. Id. at 1242 (citing Nixon v.
Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).  The decision in Bart-
lett is limited to claims involving a single minority population; that is, the deci-
sion is limited to crossover districts. Id. at 1242–43.  This Note will use the term
“crossover district,” even if the sources cited use the term “coalitional district” to
describe the same concept.
6. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). In Shaw, the Court reasoned:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our soci-
ety.  They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our his-
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law would be concerned about the role that race plays in the electoral
process.7  The Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a congressional response
that shows that concern,8 and the Act is no stranger to the Supreme
Court.9  Yet the Court had previously declined to answer an important
question: could minority voters sue to invalidate an apportionment
plan because it kept them from influencing elections through cross-
over districts?10
The Court’s answer to that question in Bartlett failed to remove
racial considerations from the districting process.  Race would have
affected the states’ districting process no matter which way the Court
ruled. Bartlett’s main contribution to addressing race in redistricting
is its treatment of intentional racial discrimination in the redistricting
process.  The Court acted to limit the ability of minorities to use race
to their advantage in the redistricting process while preventing states
from using race against minorities in the redistricting process.  In tak-
ing that approach, however, the Court gave the states increased free-
dom from federal law.
This Note will explore how Bartlett affects race and federalism in
districting decisions.  Specifically, it will argue that while the Court
did not remove race from the redistricting process, it did address in-
tentional racial discrimination in that process, and it did so in a way
that increased state independence from the federal government.  Part
II of this Note provides a background discussion of vote dilution claims
and shows how previous Supreme Court precedent left an important
question unanswered.  Part II then provides a summary of how the
Supreme Court answered that question in Bartlett v. Strickland.  Part
III analyzes the Bartlett decision and explains why, while the Court
did not remove race from the districting process, it did attempt to ad-
dress intentional discrimination in the districting process.  Part III
also shows how the decision advanced federalism by granting the
states greater freedom from congressional control.
tory, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.  Racial
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.  Racial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into com-
peting racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the nation con-
tinues to aspire.  It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our
state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Brief for the Petitioners at 37, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689) [hereinafter
Petitioners’ Brief] (“The ultimate goal of the Voting Rights Act is to minimize the
role of race in American politics.” (citations omitted)).
9. See infra notes 30–70 and accompanying text.
10. Note, The Future of Majority–Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2217 n.51 (2003).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court Had Left Unanswered Whether
a Minority Population that Could Not Form a
Majority–Minority District Had a Vote Dilution
Claim Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
When the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, Section 2 of the
Act stated in its entirety: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”11
At the time Section 2 was enacted, it was not controversial.12
What proved more controversial than the statute was the Court’s in-
terpretation of the statute.  The Court determined that Section 2 said
nothing about voting rights that the Fifteenth Amendment13 had not
already said.14  Under the Court’s Fifteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, state action “racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”15  This
meant that Section 2 only limited state action in cases of intentional
discrimination.  Congress overturned the intentional discrimination
requirement in 1982 by amending the Act to establish an effects test,
so that a defendant was liable, regardless of intent, if his actions had a
discriminatory impact.16  Not only did the amendment define viola-
tions in terms of discriminatory effects, but it provided the standard
by which those effects are judged.17  The current version of the statute
states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the Unites States to vote on account of race or color . . . .
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
11. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
12. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240 (plurality opinion).
13. The Fifteenth Amendment states: “The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
14. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980).
15. Id. at 62.
16. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240–41 (quoting Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2000)).
17. Id. at 1241 (quoting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)).
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(a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. . . . [N]othing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population.18
If this section is violated by a districting plan, at least one court
has said the original drafters of the plan should be given an opportu-
nity to correct their error,19 and if such a correction is not made,
courts may fashion relief.20  The plaintiff can propose exactly what
form that relief should take,21 but a court considering the plaintiff’s
plan should weigh the plaintiff’s interest in its own remedy with the
state’s interest in running its own elections.22
According to the Supreme Court, the 1982 changes to the VRA23
banned “dilution24 of a minority group’s voting strength, regardless of
the [state] legislature’s intent.”25  In order to find a violation under
Section 2, a court has to decide if the totality of the circumstances
show there has been a violation.26  If the vote dilution claim is suc-
cessful, the government drawing the electoral map can be forced to
draw a majority–minority district,27 which is a district where “a mi-
nority group composes a numerical, working majority of the voting-
age population.”28  Before a court considers if Section 2 has been vio-
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)–(b) (2006).
19. Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Dickinson v. Ind. State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 501 n.5 (7th Cir. 1991)).
20. Id.
21. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1002 (1994) (“[The District Court] imposed a
remedial plan offered by the De Grandy plaintiffs . . . .”).
22. Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Houston Law-
yers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991)).
23. These changes were first applied to districting after the 1990 census.  Richard H.
Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?  Social Science and Voting
Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2002).  Overall, Section 2 has
had an impact on local elections; some judges are elected in single-member dis-
tricts in part because of litigation under Section 2.  Thomas R. Phillips, The Mer-
its of Merit Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 78–79 (2009).
24. “Dilution” is “distributing politically cohesive minority voters through voting dis-
tricts in ways that reduce their potential strength.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.
Ct. 1231, 1251 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  It is “the effects
of districting decisions not on an individual’s political power viewed in isolation,
but on the political power of a group.”  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 682 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  It “may be caused either by the disper-
sal of [minorities] into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of
voters or from the concentration of [minorities] into districts where they consti-
tute an excessive majority.”  Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993) (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641 (citations omitted).
26. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 1242 (“Under present doctrine, § 2 can require the creation of these
districts.”).
28. Id. at 1242.
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lated based on the totality of the circumstances, however, a plaintiff
must meet the requirements the Supreme Court enunciated in Thorn-
burg v. Gingles.29
Thornburg v. Gingles30 was the first time the Court had addressed
a Section 2 challenge since Congress declared that Section 2 was vio-
lated by “discriminatory effect alone” rather than intent to discrimi-
nate.31  The issue in the case was whether multimember32 state
legislative districts violated Section 2 “by impairing the opportunity of
black voters to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.”33  The Court relied heavily on a Senate re-
port on the 1982 amendments which listed numerous factors to take
into consideration when deciding if a violation had occurred,34 and the
Court ultimately determined that, though a multimember district
does not always violate Section 2,35 the North Carolina scheme at is-
sue did.36
In reaching that determination, the Court enunciated the “Gingles
factors,” which would dominate future Section 2 vote dilution cases.37
Under the Gingles framework, a minority population’s claim is not
even considered under the totality of the circumstances test unless
three conditions are met:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district. . . . Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politi-
cally cohesive. . . . Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.38
Regarding the first requirement, which was the only requirement
at issue in Bartlett,39 the Court reasoned that no minority population
could win a Section 2 case without showing that the electoral system
itself was keeping them from political success.40  The smallest electo-
ral unit possible is a single-member district.41  If a minority popula-
29. Id. at 1241.
30. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
31. Id. at 35.
32. Multimember districts are those that elect more than one representative to the
relevant governing body. Id. at 35 n.2.  The multimember districts discussed in
Gingles were represented by between three and eight members. Id.
33. Id. at 34 (quoting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
34. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 43–46, 69–73, 75–76.
35. Id. at 48 (“Multimember districts and at-large election schemes, however, are not
per se violative of minority voters’ rights.”) (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 80.  The Supreme Court upheld the judgment below in one respect, id., but
that is not relevant to this Note.
37. See infra notes 44–70 and accompanying text.
38. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51 (citations omitted).
39. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1241–42 (2009) (plurality opinion).
40. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50 & n.2.
41. Id. at 50 n.2.
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tion was too small to achieve electoral success in such a district, the
minority’s preferred candidates were not being denied office by the
electoral system itself.42  The Court specifically did not say how to ad-
dress claims by voters who could not meet the first requirement, but
still claimed their power to influence elections had been hindered.43
The framework established by Gingles would be further developed
in subsequent cases.  In Growe v. Emison,44 a case from Minnesota,
the Court ruled that the Gingles factors apply to single member dis-
tricts.45  As it had done in Gingles, the Court refused to decide if a
minority population had to be able to comprise a majority in a geo-
graphically compact district to bring a Section 2 claim.46
In Voinovich v. Quilter,47 a case from Ohio, the Court addressed
allegations that minority voters had been placed into districts where
they formed a majority, which kept them from being an “influential
minority” in other districts.48  The Court assumed that such districts
could state a Section 2 claim, even though it never decided if they
could meet the first Gingles requirement.49  However, because “ra-
cially polarized voting”50 did not affect Ohio, it was impossible to meet
the third Gingles factor: the racial majority votes as a group so that
the minority candidate loses most of the time.51  Providing freedom,
and possibly guidance, for legislators, the Court also made clear that
“Section 2 contains no per se prohibitions against particular types of
districts.”52
In Johnson v. De Grandy,53 two separate minority groups chal-
lenged Florida’s districting plan for the state legislature.54  The dis-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 46 n.12.
44. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
45. Id. at 40–41; Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157–58 (1993).  Also in Growe,
which was mostly concerned with whether a federal or state court would redis-
trict Minnesota’s state legislature and Congressional seats, 507 U.S. at 27–31,
the Supreme Court affirmed its “adherence to . . . the recognition that the Consti-
tution leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportionment of their
federal congressional and state legislative districts.” Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
46. Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 n.5.
47. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
48. Id. at 154–55 (emphasis removed).
49. Id. at 154 (citing Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 n.5; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
46–47 nn.11–12 (1986)).  An “influence district” exists if “a minority group can
influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be
elected.”  Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1242 (2009) (plurality opinion).
Under current jurisprudence, Section 2 does not force the creation of influence
districts. Id.
50. Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
51. Id.; Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51 (1986).
52. Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 155.
53. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
54. Id. at 1000–02.
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trict court found that giving one minority population more
majority–minority districts would mean another minority’s number of
majority–minority districts would have to be decreased.55  Upon re-
view, the Supreme Court again assumed the first Gingles factor had
been met.56  That was not the end of the case, for a state is not liable
under Section 2 just because all the Gingles factors are satisfied.57  In
fact, the Court went on to disagree with the judgment below.58  Be-
cause minorities held a share of legislative seats about equal to their
share of the voting age population, the state was not liable under Sec-
tion 2.59  The fact that a state could have given minorities more legis-
lative seats is not enough for Section 2 liability when the share of
minority representatives is about the same as the share of minority
voters.60  However, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence declared that
“[p]roportionality is not a safe harbor” that takes a state’s plan outside
the purview of Section 2.61
The same day that De Grandy was decided, the Court decided
Holder v. Hall.62  In that dispute from Georgia, the Court declared
that Section 2 cannot be used to challenge the number of representa-
tive seats in a legislative body.63
55. Id. at 1003–04.
56. Id. at 1008–09.
57. Id. at 1011–12.  Indeed, the Gingles factors had been satisfied in cases before De
Grandy without resulting in liability. Id. at 1012 n.10 (discussing Baird v. Indi-
anapolis, 976 F.2d 357 (1992)).
58. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1009.
59. Id. at 1000.
60. Id. at 1015–16.
61. Id. at 1026 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The Court distinguished the proportional-
ity it used to uphold Florida’s plan under Section 2 with the proportional repre-
sentation that subsection 2(b) of the Act specifically disavowed by saying that
proportionality in the statute referred to electoral “success” while the proportion-
ality that validated the plan referred to “electoral power.” Id. at 1014 n.11 (ma-
jority opinion).
62. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
63. Id. at 885. Holder v. Hall is also notable because in that case Justice Thomas
wrote an extensive concurrence in which he laid out his view of Section 2. Id. at
891 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  This concurrence provides an al-
ternative view of Section 2 that has great implications for racial considerations
under Section 2, but the concurrence is beyond the scope of this Note.  Justice
Thomas has been consistent in holding to this view in subsequent Section 2 cases.
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1250 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,
511–12 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (Justice Thomas joining opinion, Part II of which reiterates reasons for dis-
missing Section 2 vote dilution claims as set out in Thomas’ concurring opinion in
Holder); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring);
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1031 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,64 a case in-
volving a Texas districting plan, the Court declared that a state has
discretion to decide where to draw district lines if it must choose be-
tween two minority groups that both have a valid Section 2 claim.65
However, a state cannot violate Section 2 when it draws one district in
the state and correct the wrong by drawing a minority district else-
where in the state if that second district is not geographically com-
pact.66  Justice Kennedy made clear that placing voters from the
Austin area in the same district with voters near the U.S.–Mexico bor-
der did not form a compact district if the two populations had different
interests.67  One of Texas’ districts was invalidated under Section 2
for denying minorities electoral opportunity because it seemed de-
signed to keep an up-and-coming minority population from voting out
the incumbent congressman.68  Justice Kennedy declined to decide if a
minority population that could not form a majority in a single-member
district could state a Section 2 claim.69  Justice Souter thought that
even though such districts might be subject to different requirements
than majority–minority districts, the Court should address the is-
sue.70  The Court finally addressed that issue in Bartlett v. Strickland.
B. In Bartlett v. Strickland the Supreme Court Answered
the Question: No
Bartlett v. Strickland revolved around a single state legislative dis-
trict: North Carolina House of Representatives District 18.71  The dis-
trict was drawn so that it would comply with the Voting Rights Act.72
It was located in the Southeastern portion of the state, and the bound-
aries were drawn in 1991 with the intent that the district would have
64. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
65. Id. at 429–30.
66. Id. at 430.
67. Id. at 435.
68. Id. at 428–29.
69. Id. at 443 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
70. Id. at 484–85 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perry con-
tained some other interesting statements from various Justices.  Justice Kennedy
stated that influence districts are not protected under Section 2, Id. at 445–46
(2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), and proportional political representation is not
constitutionally mandated. Id. at 419 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  Chief Justice
Roberts recognized that meeting the Gingles factors did not automatically satisfy
a Section 2 claim. Id. at 508 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  Justice Scalia stated his belief that
intentional drawing of a majority–minority district is presumptively motivated
by race and subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“In my view, however, when a legisla-
ture intentionally creates a majority–minority district, race is necessarily its pre-
dominant motivation.”).
71. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1239 (2009) (plurality opinion).
72. Id.
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an African-American voting-age majority.73  However, North Caro-
lina’s state constitution, in what is known as the Whole County Provi-
sion, does not allow House districts to divide counties.74  As a result of
this requirement, North Carolina’s first two attempts to redistrict fol-
lowing the 2000 census were invalidated by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court.75  The version of District 18 considered by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Bartlett was drawn in 2003, when North
Carolina’s legislature76 could not create a “geographically compact
majority–minority district” in the area of District 18 due to population
changes.77  North Carolina’s legislature drew District 18 to contain
portions of Pender and New Hanover counties, thinking that minority
voters and majority voters would vote together to elect the minority’s
preferred candidate.78  In other words, the legislature meant to create
a crossover district.
District 18 had an African-American voting age population of
39.36%, just 4.03% above the 35.33% the district would have had if
Pender County had not been divided.79  Pender County and its Board
of Commissioners then sued, claiming a violation of the Whole County
Provision.80  In response, the defendant government officials argued
that the Whole County Provision and Section 2 were incompatible as
applied to District 18.81  The trial court decided that District 18 was
effectively a majority–minority district since African-Americans could
obtain enough votes from the white majority to elect their candidate;
in other words, District 18 was a crossover district.82  Under the total-
ity of the circumstances, Pender County had to be divided.83  The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, determining that Section 2
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1239 (citing Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C. 2007),
aff’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009)).  The “Whole County
Provision” says that “[n]o county shall be divided in the formation of a represen-
tative district.”  Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C. 2007) (cit-
ing N.C. CONST. art. II, § 5(3)), aff’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct.
1231 (2009).
75. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1239 (plurality opinion) (citing Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582
S.E.2d 247, 254 (N.C. 2003); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 392 (N.C.
2002), stay denied, 535 U.S. 1301 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers)).
76. North Carolina’s state legislature is known as the “General Assembly” and con-
tains a House of Representatives and a Senate. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1239.




80. Id. at 1239–40.  That meant that, atypically, the defendant had to establish that
the Gingles factors were satisfied. Id.
81. Id. at 1239.
82. Id. at 1240.
83. Id.
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would not force a division of Pender County unless African-Americans
formed a numerical majority of District 18’s voting age citizens.84
Therefore, the main question in the case was the question the
Court had refused to answer in previous cases: “[w]hat size minority
group is sufficient to satisfy the first Gingles requirement.”85
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,86 rejected the
notion that District 18 was protected by Section 2.87  The Voting
Rights Act language itself supported a requirement that to have a Sec-
tion 2 claim, a minority population possibly could be placed in a dis-
trict where it constitutes over 50% of the population.88  In short, the
Court adopted a 50% rule.89  Without an ability to elect a candidate on
their own votes, a minority group is comparable to other groups of the
same population in the district.90  If crossover districts were allowed,
they would give “minority voters a right to preserve their strength for
the purpose of forging an advantageous political alliance,” a right not
granted by Section 2.91  There is a difference between the choice made
by a racial minority and the choice made by a combination of a racial
minority and some majority voters.92  Allowing claims from the latter
combination would lead to a reworking of Gingles.93  The plurality de-
scribed a conflict between the first and third Gingles factors—a large
number of crossover voters would make it unlikely that the majority
would vote cohesively enough to meet the third Gingles
requirement.94
Additionally, “workable standards” were needed.95  Without them,
courts would end up making decisions about political contests based
on race.96  Section 2 applies to all the states,97 and forcing courts na-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1242.
86. Justices Thomas and Scalia were essential to upholding the North Carolina Su-
preme Court’s decision since only three Justices joined the plurality opinion. Id.
at 1238.  Justices Scalia and Thomas continued to support the view, expressed
some fifteen years earlier in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment), that Section 2 does not permit a vote dilution claim
in any circumstance. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
87. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1243 (plurality opinion).
88. Id. The Supreme Court in Bartlett took the position that the relevant population
was the citizen voting-age population, or CVAP. Id. at 1250 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1243 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 1243–44.
93. Id. at 1244 (citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993)).
94. Id. at 1244.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1244–45.
97. Id. at 1245.
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tionwide to focus on race in reaching their decisions is not to be done
lightly because race-based decision making is fraught with constitu-
tional concerns.98  Federal circuit court law was clearly on the side of
a numerical 50% requirement, and the plurality opinion was happy to
leave that law undisturbed.99
The plurality opinion attempted to ward off attacks against the
Court’s decision.  To say that crossover districts are protected under
Section 2 because they provide minority populations electoral opportu-
nity required too broad a reading of the statute.100  “Section 2 does not
guarantee minority voters an electoral advantage.”101  Rather, cross-
over district minority voters have as much opportunity as any other
group with the same number of voters.102  Concerns about the incon-
sistency between a 50% numerical requirement and application of the
“totality of the circumstances” requirement were misplaced—there is
no conflict because the Gingles factors are gate keepers for the totality
of the circumstances test.103  Furthermore, Equal Protection Clause
violations might occur without a majority–minority requirement.104
The plurality opinion also contains several statements that demon-
strate the latitude the states have under the ruling.105  Legislatures
have the freedom to create crossover districts; the decision does not
mandate majority–minority districts.106  Section 2 does not even force
a state to keep a crossover district, though purposely drawing district
lines to destroy an “effective crossover district[ ] . . . would raise seri-
ous questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.”107  Indeed, since no intentional wrongdoing was alleged in the
case, the “holding does not apply to cases in which there is intentional
discrimination against a racial minority.”108  In the cases where Bart-
lett does apply, Section 2 does not force states to draw crossover dis-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1246.  Those federal courts of appeals that have been confronted with the
issue have interpreted the first Gingles factor to require a majority–minority
standard. Id.
100. Id. at 1246–47.
101. Id. at 1246.
102. Id. at 1246–47.
103. Id. at 1247.
104. Id.  It has also been argued that crossover districts could be a way to follow the
Voting Rights Act without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The Future of
Majority–Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting,
supra note 10, at 2215.
105. The view of Justices Thomas and Scalia, which would construe Section 2 as not
encompassing a vote dilution claim at all, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1238 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment), would allow the states greater freedom still.
106. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 1248–49 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1246.
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tricts.109  Section 2 only forces states to draw majority–minority
districts “if all three Gingles factors are met and if § 2 applies based
on a totality of the circumstances.”110  Crossover districts have not
been entirely removed from Section 2 jurisprudence, however, because
states can use crossover districts in defending against Section 2
claims.111  Though America has not reached a time of equal opportu-
nity for all races, Section 2 should neither “entrench racial differ-
ences” nor should it force on society the interracial cooperation it is
already attaining voluntarily.112  In the end, the Court held that
“[o]nly when a geographically compact group of minority voters could
form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles re-
quirement been met.”113
Justice Souter, on the other hand, would have held “a district may
be a minority–opportunity district so long as a cohesive minority popu-
lation is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined
with a reliable number of crossover voters from an otherwise polarized
majority.”114  According to Justice Souter, the Court’s holding will en-
trench race in politics by entrenching majority–minority districts.115
Souter’s dissent also argued that Congress has not indicated that
majority–minority districts are the only way to safeguard minority
electoral opportunity under Section 2.116  Crossover districts help
meet Section 2’s goals, and Section 2’s legislative history does not con-
tain a basis for thinking crossover districts are a less legitimate means
of addressing vote dilution than majority–minority districts.117  Cross-
over districts, in fact, are superior to majority–minority districts be-
109. Id. at 1248–49 (“[Section] 2 can[not] require the creation of crossover districts in
the first instance.”).
110. Id. at 1248.
111. Id. at 1249 (“States can—and in proper cases should—defend against alleged § 2
violations by pointing to crossover voting patterns and to effective crossover
districts.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.  Without limiting districts to those that are geographically compact, states
could draw contorted districts combining different minority populations from
around the state to create a majority–minority district, tending toward “a scheme
under which members of different racial groups are divided into separate electo-
ral registers and allocated a proportion of political power on the basis of race.”
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted).  It would also lead to serious constitutional concerns.  Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding a valid claim under the Equal Protection
Clause where appellants alleged the state legislature “adopted a reapportion-
ment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification”).
114. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Souter, J., dissenting).  In other words, according to
Justice Souter, crossover districts are protected by Section 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1253.
117. Id.
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cause they reduce racial considerations and make people of different
races work together.118  No fixed, definite population is necessary to
state a claim under Section 2, but if racial voting polarization declines
it will become easier to satisfy the first Gingles factor.119  There is
some limit,120 but that limit did not need to be determined in
Bartlett.121
Justice Souter took issue with several points of the plurality opin-
ion.  He discussed how a minority group comprising less than 50% of
the overall population does not automatically have as much electoral
opportunity as any other group of the same population—that might or
might not be the case.122  According to Justice Souter, the plurality
did not recognize that the entire state districting plan has to be ex-
amined as a whole to see if minority opportunity is close to proportion-
ate.123  The requirement that a minority group have the potential to
elect a candidate of its choice does not necessarily counsel a 50% re-
quirement—there is no guarantee that a minority population above
50% in a district will have the potential to elect the candidate of its
choice.124  Justice Souter also described how the first and third Gin-
gles factors are not in tension;  both could be met in the same case.125
In addition, the 50% rule, which seems easy to administer, might
not be so simple to follow—courts will still face the challenge of evalu-
ating whether a districting plan passes the totality of the circum-
stances test.126  Saving judicial resources, Justice Souter opined,
comes at the cost of barring relief to claims that should be protected by
Section 2.127
In Justice Souter’s estimation, the best way the states can avoid
litigation under the plurality opinion is by drawing majority–minority
118. Id. at 1254–55.
119. Id. at 1254.
120. Justice Souter suggests this might be defined by the cohesive racial majority vot-
ing requirement, the final factor of the Gingles trio. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1255.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1255–56.
125. Id. at 1257 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned:
If a minority population with 49% of the CVAP can elect the candidate of
its choice with crossover by 2% of white voters, the minority “by defini-
tion” relies on white support to elect its preferred candidate. But this
fact alone would raise no doubt, as a matter of definition or otherwise,
that the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met, since as much as
98% of the majority may have voted against the minority’s candidate of
choice.
Id.; see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 8, at 44–45 (suggesting a hypothetical
leading to a similar conclusion).
126. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1257 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
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districts.128  Since majority–minority districts are the only way to cor-
rect a Section 2 violation, crossover districts will likely die out.129
Crossover districts can be used as a defense to a Section 2 claim under
the plurality opinion, but not as a remedy.130  If states can comply
with Section 2 by drawing a crossover district, then it must be possible
to force a state to draw a crossover district under Section 2, and there
is the potential that eliminating a crossover district will violate Sec-
tion 2.131  If that potential violation of Section 2 is realized, a lawsuit
should be available to remedy that violation.132
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett v. Strickland does not
herald an end to race’s role in American elections.  Race would have
remained a consideration in districting decisions regardless of the
Court’s ruling.  What the Court did do was interpret Section 2 and
Gingles in a way that addresses intentional discrimination in district-
ing decisions.  In doing so, however, the Court gave the states greater
freedom from federal law as they perform their traditional districting
role.
A. Race Would Be Considered in Districting Decisions
Regardless of the Court’s Ruling in Bartlett v. Strickland
The plurality opinion in Bartlett v. Strickland stated that crossover
districts could reduce the impact of race as voters unite across racial
lines to work toward a common goal,133 going so far as to state cross-
over districts could be “the most effective way to maximize minority
voting strength.”134  Justice Souter’s dissent declared that a crossover
district is better than a majority–minority district, which focuses on
race.135  The divide in Bartlett v. Strickland was not over the benefits
of crossover districts, but over whether Section 2 forced those benefits
upon the states.
One of the motivations behind the Court’s decision was a desire to
keep Section 2 from “entrench[ing] racial differences by expanding a
statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics.”136
128. Id. at 1259.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1259–60.
132. Id. at 1260.
133. Id. at 1248 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 1248 (quoting Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003)).
135. Id. at 1254 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1020 (1994)).
136. Id. at 1249 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Examining arguments for and against the 50% rule, however, indi-
cates that racial differences will still play a role in districting
decisions.
Allowing crossover district claims would not eliminate race from
districting decisions.  Supporters of the 50% rule claim requiring
crossover districts under Section 2 would transform the Voting Rights
Act from a “shield . . . from unequal treatment” into a sword of “special
treatment denied to citizens of other races.”137  In this case, because of
the relevant provisions of North Carolina’s state constitution, the Act
would do so at the expense of a districting criterion enshrined in state
law—keeping political units such as counties in the same district.138
There is no doubt that districting by political units is permissible.139
Indeed, one amicus brief reflected fear that the lack of a 50% rule
would lead to racial divisions and politicians insensitive to those who
did not share the politician’s race.140
Proponents argued that without a 50% rule, disaster would ensue.
Section 2 would become a weapon which minorities could use to gain
disproportional electoral success.141  Indeed, the Voting Rights Act
can be a weapon to wield for political advantage.142  The sword of Vot-
ing Rights Act litigation would be pointed at all fifty states as even
small populations of racial minorities could allege violations.143  Al-
lowing claims from a minority population which constitutes less than
50% of the voting age population would create the potential to maxi-
mize minority voting power, which goes beyond the bounds of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.144
These arguments, however, are not without counterarguments.
There are limits to the ability of a minority population to use Section 2
as a weapon.  Eventually the number of crossover votes needed to win
an election becomes so large that the third Gingles requirement—that




140. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of Respondents
at 32, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689).
141. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 137, at 13.  The United States was also concerned
about minority populations obtaining an advantage over other populations under
Section 2.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance
at 19, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689) [hereinafter United States Brief].
142. Pildes, supra note 23, at 1552 (discussing Professor Samuel Issacharoff’s observa-
tions on how the courts’ approach to gerrymandering cases allows legal precedent
on race to be used for political ends).
143. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 137, at 28 (citing Pender County v. Bartlett, 649
S.E.2d 364, 373 (N.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231
(2009)).
144. See id. at 31–35.  Maximizing minority representation approximates the propor-
tional representation expressly disavowed in subsection 2(b). Id. at 32.
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the majority vote as a united bloc against the minority candidate—is
not met, and there is no claim.145  “[F]unctional majority claims are
inherently self-limiting.”146  Indeed, the “tension” between the first
and third Gingles prongs that helped induce the Court to establish the
50% rule147 need not be seen as a reason to establish the rule, but
rather as the mechanism that limits the population needed to estab-
lish a Section 2 claim in the absence of such a rule.148  Additionally,
the difficulty in bringing a Section 2 claim places limits on Section 2
suits.149
The Court, of course, did not settle for such limitations.  Rather
than accepting a Section 2 sword dulled by a third Gingles factor limi-
tation on crossover district claims, it broke the sword by holding that
crossover districts do not have Section 2 protection.150
Naturally, the interplay between race and the districting process
was a reason to deny Section 2 protection to crossover districts.  The
United States government was concerned that requiring crossover dis-
tricts would increase race’s role in districting.151  Justice Kennedy
was concerned that allowing crossover district claims under Section 2
“would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting,
raising serious constitutional questions.”152  The number of districts
drawn mainly because of race would go up, not down, if crossover dis-
trict claims were allowed.153  Allowing crossover districts would fuse
party and race,154 making it even harder to district in non-political,
race neutral ways.155  Thus, allowing crossover districts would “ex-
tend[ ] racial considerations even further into the districting process,”
145. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1254 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Brief of the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 13–14, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07–689) [hereinafter Lawyers’
Brief] (arguing that higher crossover voting rates make suits more likely to fail
because of the third Gingles factor).
146. Lawyers’ Brief, supra note 145, at 13.
147. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1244 (plurality opinion).
148. Id. at 1254 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 29–30; Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 12–13,
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689) (suggesting that New Jersey’s experience
indicates allowing crossover claims would not create flood of litigation); Lawyers’
Brief, supra note 145, at 5, 12 (discussing the difficulty of winning a Section 2
lawsuit).
150. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248–49 (plurality opinion).
151. United States Brief, supra note 141, at 21–22.
152. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1247 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,
446 (2006)).
153. Id. at 1247 (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at 1247–48.  This requires that race and voting remain correlated for a sub-
stantial period of time. Id. at 1248.
155. Id. at 1248.
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with results so harmful that “[the Court] must not interpret § 2 to re-
quire crossover districts.”156
Allowing crossover district claims under Section 2 would send a
message that there are situations where a districting legislature may
consider race, since Section 2’s purpose, as construed by the Court, is
to secure minority electoral opportunity by protecting minorities’ abil-
ity to “elect representatives of their choice.”157  Indeed, section 2 forces
states to consider race when districting in order to avoid denying mi-
nority populations electoral opportunity.158  Furthermore, race will be
the primary goal for some crossover districts if states draw them spe-
cifically to meet the racial considerations imposed by Section 2.159
Thus, allowing crossover districts would not expunge race from
America’s districting process.
However, the 50% rule also faces several charges, including that it
“perpetuates racial balkanization.”160  The NAACP argued that with-
out crossover districts, minority members of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly would effectively vanish,161 since successful crossover
districts that cannot qualify as majority–minority districts can be lost
in the redistricting process without Section 2 protection.162
Justice Souter foresaw an increase in majority–minority districts,
which would impede the development of biracial coalitions.163  This
would amount to legal support of “racial blocs, and the role of race in
districting decisions as a proxy for political identification [would] be
heightened by any measure.”164  A legislature would naturally create
some crossover districts as it draws district lines; if states could count
156. Id.
157. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
158. See id. § 1973(a)–(b); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986).
159. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 34–35; Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1258 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
160. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 1.
161. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, Cindy Moore, Milford Farrior, Mary Jordan, and
the American Civil Liberties Union Out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 5, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689) [hereinafter NAACP
Brief].
162. Id. at 17–18.  This has the appearance of being particularly invidious since
Pender and New Hanover counties were originally drawn to dilute the minority
vote. Id. at 19.  However, states need to avoid intentional racial discrimination
whichever route they take; Bartlett “does not apply to cases in which there is
intentional discrimination against a racial minority.” Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1246
(plurality opinion).  This comports with the United States’ contention that if in-
tentional discrimination is present, the majority–minority requirement should be
inapplicable.  United States Brief, supra note 141, at 13–14 (citing Garza v.
County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 770–71 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028
(1991)).
163. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
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these districts towards their Section 2 requirements, less of the state’s
districting decision would be controlled by Section 2.165  Instead, Jus-
tice Souter argued states will forego crossover districts to create ma-
jority–minority districts and avoid Section 2 liability.166
The concern about the effects of a 50% rule on state legislatures is
an important consideration.  States may draw majority–minority dis-
tricts because they desire to avoid litigation and are unwilling to take
the risk of creating crossover districts.  They may also draw such dis-
tricts because they desire to district minorities into as few districts as
possible and will use Bartlett as a legal basis for doing so.  Note, how-
ever, that in this latter case, if the legislature’s motivation is a desire
to district a racial minority because of race, then Bartlett does not of-
fer protection since it does not protect against intentional racial dis-
crimination.167  However, it is quite likely that such districting
practices will be based on party affiliation rather than race,168 or at
least that will be the excuse.  Whether race is being considered for its
own sake or as a proxy for a political party, race is still playing a role
in the districting process.
Therefore, with or without a 50% rule, race will play a role in the
districting process.  The Bartlett Court should not be faulted for this,
for this result is inherent in Section 2 as interpreted by the Gingles
framework.  Indeed, even the Gingles Court acknowledged the connec-
tion between race and the framework it established: “Clearly, only the
race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilu-
tion analysis.”169  Any successful claim will force a state to redistrict
based on racial considerations in order to protect minority opportu-
nity.170  This is not “a political system in which race no longer
matters.”171
Without an overhaul of Section 2 jurisprudence, the Bartlett Court
could not remove all consideration of race from the districting process.
What it did do, however, was address intentional discrimination in the
districting process.
165. Id. at 1258.
166. Id. at 1259.
167. Id. at 1246 (plurality opinion).
168. Race and political party are significantly connected.  Charles S. Bullock, III &
Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Repre-
sentation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1214 (1999) (“[T]he [minority] vote constitutes a
greater share of the vote in a Democratic primary than in a general election, so
prospects for electing [minority candidates] rise when the determination is made
in the primary.”).
169. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986) (citations omitted).
170. “A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if . . . members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) . . . have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate . . . to elect representatives of their choice.”  Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
171. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
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B. Bartlett Speaks to Intentional Discrimination in the
Districting Process
Bartlett limits Section 2 by saying no Section 2 claim exists unless
it is possible to create a majority–minority district, effectively mean-
ing that Section 2 does not even apply unless it is possible to draw a
majority–minority district.172  Because Bartlett declared crossover
districts outside the purview of Section 2, minority groups that cannot
form a compact majority–minority district cannot use Section 2 to
have district lines drawn in a way favorable to them because of their
race.  This prevents them from using intentional discrimination to
their advantage.
The plurality opinion goes even further.  It encourages states to
assert crossover districts as a defense in Section 2 litigation.  Indeed,
even if a Section 2 claim survives the gate-keeping Gingles require-
ments, a crossover district could be held valid under the totality of the
circumstances test.173  The Court did not apply the totality of the cir-
cumstances test to District 18.174  It did not need to, because it is im-
possible to pass the first Gingles condition without the possibility of
drawing a “geographically compact” majority–minority “single-mem-
ber district.”175
Meeting the Gingles factors does not prove the whole case.176
“Proof of the Gingles preconditions is not alone sufficient to establish a
claim of vote dilution under Section 2.”177  Regardless of what actually
occurs in practice, Bartlett creates the possibility that a crossover dis-
trict could satisfy the Gingles requirements and state a claim, yet nev-
ertheless fail to succeed on that claim under the totality of the
circumstances test.  Allowing the possibility of a defense even though
the Gingles factors are satisfied178 is consistent with the freedom
states have in complying with Section 2.179
The Court’s holding limited minorities’ ability to force states to dis-
criminate in their favor in the districting process.  This leads to an-
172. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1260 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“In short, to the extent the
plurality’s holding is taken to control future results, the plurality has eliminated
the protection of § 2 for [crossover] districts . . . .”).
173. Id. at 1249 (plurality opinion).  Justice Souter did not see this as a logical possi-
bility.  He reasoned that if crossover districts are not protected, they cannot offer
electoral opportunity, so a state cannot assert them as a defense alleging they
provide electoral opportunity. Id. at 1259–60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1240–49 (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 1249.
176. Brief of the Florida House of Representatives, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 8, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689) [hereinafter Florida
House Brief].
177. Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2004).
178. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1249 (plurality opinion).
179. States’ freedom under Bartlett is discussed later in this Note. See infra notes
183–227 and accompanying text.
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other question: Does that mean the Court also limited minorities’
ability to counter attempts to discriminate against them?
The Court tried to address that concern.  A “blatant racial gerry-
mander[ ]”180 would not be protected by the Court, which limited its
holding to cases of non-intentional racial discrimination.181  Theoreti-
cally, then, Bartlett does not remove the protection of federal law
against intentional, racially motivated discrimination.  Practically, of
course, the story could be quite different.  In the modern political era,
at least among minority voters, race and party are correlated.182  Dis-
trict lines could be drawn out of political rather than racial discrimi-
nation, and the Court has not embraced political discrimination.183
Intentional racial discrimination could be difficult to detect where it
does exist.  Not only is there a correlation between race and political
affiliation,184 but since elected officials can face severe political reper-
cussions if they admit to discriminating on the basis of race, the politi-
cal environment provides an incentive to conceal intentional racial
discrimination.185
Whatever the practical outcome, however, Bartlett is a balancing
act of two concepts, limiting the ability of racial minorities to force
states to intentionally discriminate in their favor, while also limiting
the ability of the legislature to intentionally discriminate against
those same minority populations when drawing district lines.
180. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1019 (1994).
181. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1246 (plurality opinion).
182. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 168, at 1214 (“[T]he [minority] vote constitutes a
greater share of the vote in a Democratic primary than in a general election, so
prospects for electing [minority candidates] rise when the determination is made
in the primary.”).
183. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
184. See Bullock & Dunn, supra note 168, at 1240 (noting that “if blacks continue to
win near universal support among black voters and African-American turnout
stays at reasonable levels, blacks can win in districts less than fifty percent black
if they get about a third of the white vote,” which is not unusual for Democratic
candidates in the South); Pildes, supra note 23, at 1534 (“The rise of two-party
competition in the 1990s ironically contributes significantly to explaining the
greater success minority candidates are now projected to have in the South.  As
white voters have moved to the Republican Party in the South, black voters have
become increasingly powerful in Democratic Party primaries.”).
185. In 2002, Senator Trent Lott commented at Senator Strom Thurmond’s 100th
birthday party that the nation would have benefitted if Thurmond had won the
presidency in 1948.  Thurmond ran on a segregationist ticket.  Senator Lott, fol-
lowing the furor over his comment, resigned his position as leader of the Republi-
cans in the Senate.  Carl Hulse, Lott Fails to Quell Furor and Quits Top Senate
Post; Frist Emerges as Successor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at A1.  Senator Lott
did not mention race in his comment.  Id.  In such a political environment, at
least for some politicians, to actually admit to discriminating on the basis of race
could be political suicide.
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C. Bartlett Advanced Federalism by Reducing
Congressional Control Over the States’ Redistricting
Processes
Many states believed that allowing crossover district claims under
Section 2 would give them increased freedom, since they could meet
their Section 2 obligations while focusing on non-racial criteria.186
What Bartlett gave them, however, is complete freedom from Section 2
unless a reasonably compact majority–minority district can be cre-
ated.187  “[Section] 2 does not mandate creating or preserving cross-
over districts. . . .  Majority–minority districts are only required if all
three Gingles factors are met and if § 2 applies based on a totality of
the circumstances.”188
If it is impossible to create a reasonably compact major-
ity–minority district anywhere in the state, Section 2 does not apply to
the state at all.  If it is possible for the state to draw a major-
ity–minority district, the state still has the freedom to draw crossover
districts instead and defend the plan under the totality of the circum-
stances test, since crossover districts can be used to satisfy the re-
quirements of Section 2.189
Barlett thus speaks to concerns about the states’ ability to control
their own districting processes.  Even the federal government was con-
cerned about the states’ ability to perform their redistricting task if
Section 2 was interpreted to require crossover districts, foreseeing
that state districting flexibility would decrease in that instance.190
In addition to flexibility, the 50% rule gives the states direction.
The Florida House of Representatives supported the 50% rule because
it wanted to have the standards it needed to redistrict according to the
law,191 and it feared an increased potential for litigation if crossover
districts were protected under Section 2.192  The Florida House of Rep-
resentatives offered additional arguments in favor of a 50% rule.  If
Section 2 covered crossover districts, the courts would be required to
decide when a minority population was entitled to a representative,
intruding on the Florida Legislature’s role in the redistricting pro-
186. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 34–35.
187. The ultimate result of Bartlett was, perhaps, suggested as early as 2002. See
Pildes, supra note 23, at 1570–71.
188. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 1248–49.
190. United States Brief, supra note 141, at 22–25.  Of course, states would still be
free to create crossover districts if they so desire. Id. at 27–28.
191. Florida House Brief, supra note 175, at 1.  It is interesting to note that Florida’s
state legislature, which actually has to do the work of redistricting, wanted a 50%
rule, while the brief for the states that opposed the 50% rule was signed by those
states’ attorneys general.  States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 36–38.
192. Florida House Brief, supra note 176, at 1.
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cess.193  In contrast, a 50% requirement would reduce the judicial role
in districting.194  Additionally, without a standard, the courts would
have a mess of litigation, and adding to that mess would be multiple
minority groups vying for the same representative seat.195  It is inher-
ently difficult for a court to decide if a group could have a Section 2
claim without a 50% rule.196
In addition to its effect on the state legislatures, a 50% rule also
benefits the courts.  Most courts have used the 50% rule in crossover
district cases.197  This keeps them from guessing the outcome of politi-
cal alliances198 and trying to figure out how large a minority popula-
tion has to be to state a Section 2 claim.199
The 50% rule also has implications for the states’ role in redistrict-
ing.  Various states argued that if the 50% rule was adopted by the
Court, “state legislatures will need to adopt a formalistic approach to
redistricting that ignores political realities.”200  Not only that, but
constitutional equal protection issues would arise if the states drew
majority–minority districts in response to the ruling.201  In contrast,
covering crossover districts under Section 2 would send a message to
state legislatures to limit the number of majority–minority districts
they draw, which would follow “the equal protection prohibition on the
use of race as the dominant consideration in redistricting deci-
sions.”202  Because crossover districts are based “heavily” on things
other than race, race will not be the main consideration in drawing
crossover districts,203 and such districts will not suggest “that political
identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.”204  Crossover districts
combine voters by politics, not race, and force politicians to represent
their entire electorate instead of a single race.205
This interracial cooperation in crossover districts is due a second
look.  Section 2 jurisprudence secures minority electoral opportunity
by protecting minorities’ ability to “elect representatives of their
choice.”206  A politician aware that he holds office because he is the
minority’s choice will have a tendency “to represent the [minority] in-
193. Id.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 137, at 20–25.
198. Id. at 15.
199. Id. at 28 (citing Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 373 (N.C. 2007), aff’d
sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009)).
200. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 1.
201. Id. at 31.
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. at 31–32.
204. Id. at 32 (quoting Pildes, supra note 23, at 1547).
205. Id. at 32–33.
206. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
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terest.”207  Indeed, if his district is created to give minorities political
power, how could such a representative not “represent the [minority]
interest?”208  Crossover districts are no guarantee against the racial
balkanization the Supreme Court fears.209
Bartlett, of course, did not remove the states from the control of the
Voting Rights Act completely.  The freedom given the states under
Bartlett does not include the freedom to intentionally discriminate
based on race.210  States can district as they like, without fear that
Section 2 will be used against them in court, under two conditions.
First, there must be no possibility of drawing a reasonably compact
majority–minority district, and thus the Gingles requirements, as in-
terpreted by Bartlett, cannot be satisfied; second, the state may not
intentionally discriminate against racial minorities when drawing dis-
trict lines.  If they do, Bartlett’s exception for intentional discrimina-
tion is triggered.  This breathing room from Section 2’s control limits
the federal restraints on the states’ redistricting efforts.  This en-
hances federalism’s division of power between the state and federal
governments. Bartlett therefore deserves to be called “a victory for
federalism.”211
Redistricting is not often considered a check on the power of Con-
gress, but redistricting is a check, and one that should be preserved.
Congress can, and has, passed significant regulation regarding vot-
ing.212  Congress can prescribe how senatorial and congressional elec-
tions will be held.213  Congress determines whether its members have
satisfied the constitutional prerequisites to serve.214  But Congress
does not draw the actual congressional district lines; that task prima-
rily falls to the states215 and, if need be, the courts.216  Congress his-
207. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Id.
209. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
210. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“Our hold-
ing does not apply to cases in which there is intentional discrimination against a
racial minority.”); id. at 1249 (“[I]f there were a showing that a State intention-
ally drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise effective crossover districts,
that would raise serious questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.”) (citations omitted).
211. John J. Park, Jr., Bartlett v. Strickland: Is a Stopping Point Near for Race-Con-
scious Districting?, ENGAGE, July 16, 2009, at 48, available at http://www.fed-soc.
org/doclib/20090720_ParkEngage102.pdf.
212. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Help America Vote Act
of 2002 § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006).
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  Congress cannot, however, dictate where senatorial
elections take place. Id.
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
215. “[T]he Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportion-
ment of their federal congressional and state legislative districts.”  Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
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torically has had little to do with the districting process—indeed,
Section 2’s coverage of vote dilution claims depends on a judicial inter-
pretation of Section 2.217
Ever since Governor Gerry districted Massachusetts to benefit his
party in 1812,218 districting has been used for political purposes.  If
Congress were allowed to draw Congressional district lines, it could
attempt to entrench its current membership for life.  Congress should
not be allowed to draw its own districts any more than a fox should be
allowed to guard a hen house.  The more federal regulation governs
redistricting, the closer Congress comes to drawing the district lines
itself.  Federalism’s division between the states and the federal gov-
ernment supports Congressional restraint in imposing regulations on
the states’ districting processes.
In the modern scheme of political reality, however, political parties
would seem to form the missing link between Congress and the states
that would make state districting less relevant.  Consider this argu-
ment: the real political power in America today is not really wielded
by Congress or the state legislatures.  Instead, political parties wield
power by operating through Congress and the state legislatures.  If
one party controls both Congress and the state legislatures, the divi-
sion between congressional power and power to district Congress
means less.
The check in this case is partly derived from the two-party system.
When one party controls Congress and another controls the districting
process in a local legislature, the state legislature can conduct its dis-
tricting task to maximize the number of seats won by the party in the
congressional minority, helping establish a political check on
Congress.219
Even with the influence of political parties, interfering with the
separation between state redistricting and congressional power can be
dangerous.  Part of the genius of House Majority Whip Tom DeLay
was his recognition of the connection between power in the state capi-
tol and power on Capitol Hill.  The Texas representative sought to
gain control of the Texas Legislature in order to redraw the congres-
sional map and thereby increase the Republican congressional delega-
tion.220  DeLay’s funding efforts for Texas state legislative campaigns
216. Id. at 27.
217. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
218. Money in Politics, What is Gerrymandering?, http://www.ohiocitizen.org/money/
redistrict/gerrymandering.html (last visited May 12, 2010) (“The original gerry-
mander was created in 1812 by Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry, who
crafted a district for political purposes that looked like a salamander.”).
219. See supra notes 212–14 and accompanying text.
220. Glen Justice & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 3 DeLay Aides Facing Charges In Fund-
Raising, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at A1.
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ultimately led to an indictment221 and contributed to his eventual
downfall.222  Thus the state power of redistricting served to check the
power of one of the most powerful congressmen in recent memory.223
If politics will play a powerful role in districting, and the federal gov-
ernment is going to wield power in districting, that power should be
shared with the states to provide a check on the federal
government.224
The check that districting provides on Congress also has a local
connection.  A congressman might speak on a national stage, but the
district that sent him there was drawn by local politicians.  This pro-
vides another link, though an imperfect one,225 between the congress-
man and his state.
221. The Fall of the Hammer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at A22.
222. Philip Shenon & Carl Hulse, Delay Is Indicted in Texas Case and Forfeits G.O.P.
House Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1.
223. Id. DeLay’s nickname was “the Hammer.” See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Primary
for DeLay’s Seat Is Shaping Up as Referendum on the Incumbent, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2006, at A14.  The ultimate success of Texas’ plan, however, is worth
noting.  Even though the Texas congressional map was redrawn in the middle of
an election cycle, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the redistricting, de-
spite that some editing was required.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006).  Though DeLay was a powerful force behind the
facts of the case, his name never appeared in the opinion.
224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular govern-
ment, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.  To secure
the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular gov-
ernment, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. . . .
By what means is this object attainable?  Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the
same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent
passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situa-
tion, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.
Id.  Power should be split between the states and federal government on this is-
sue to:
[e]xtend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and in-
terests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a com-
mon motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
Id. at 52.
225. National political machines can be involved in local politics.  Republican National
Committee Chairman Michael Steele recently said of a victorious mayoral candi-
date, “Candidates like [him] . . . are the future of the Republican Party and I look
forward to helping them all toward victory.”  Matthew Reichbach, ABQ Election:
RNC congratulates Berry on winning non–partisan race, THE NEW MEXICO INDE-
PENDENT, October 6, 2009, http://newmexicoindependent.com/38638/abq–election
–rnc–congratulates–berry–on–winning–non–partisan–race.  Democrats proclaim,
“The Democratic Party is committed to winning elections at every level in every
region of the country, and we’re getting started right now with a massive effort to
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Not only does the districting function provide a check on Congress,
but it provides a role for the states in the national government.  Al-
lowing the states a role in national government increases the number
of actors involved in exercising national power, which makes it more
difficult to turn national power against the people.226
Though states must follow the constitutional dictates of the federal
government,227 state influence over the federal government has
eroded over the years.  The states have lost their direct representation
in the Senate as a result of the direct election of Senators,228 but they
still have some influence over the House of Representatives through
the districting power.229  How the district lines are drawn affects
many political fortunes, even though the districting power is normally
exercised only once every ten years.230  With the check on Congress
that districting provides, it is better for the districting power to re-
main with the states than for Congress to take that power unto itself
through regulation. Bartlett supports keeping the districting power
with the states by declaring the states free from Section 2, unless it is
possible to draw a majority–minority district.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bartlett did not expunge race from the electoral process.  Because
of the requirements of Section 2 jurisprudence itself, states and judges
will still be forced to think about the race of the voters they district.
Essentially, the Court eliminated a situation in which minorities
could attempt to gain favorable discrimination, while limiting its hold-
ing so that intentional discrimination on the basis of race in the dis-
tricting process was not protected.  Racial minorities cannot use
Section 2 for favorable discrimination unless they can form a major-
ity–minority district in reasonable geographic bounds, and the states
cannot intentionally discriminate in districting without losing the pro-
tection of Bartlett.  The Court has interpreted Section 2 in a way that
limits the situations where Section 2 applies to the states.  This sup-
ports the separation between the power of Congress and the power to
fund organizers on the ground in every state.”  The Democratic Party, A 50 State
Strategy, http://www.democrats.org/a/party/a_50_state_strategy/ (last visited
May 12, 2010).
226. See supra note 224.
227. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
229. States’ Brief, supra note 3, at 1.
230. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Perry makes clear that a state can redistrict
between the two censuses.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399, 446 (2006).
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district Congress.  The decision was a win for the states, even though
the “sordid business, this divvying us up by race,”231 will continue.
231. Perry, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part).
